INTRODUCTION
For most of their history, United Nations peacekeeping operation deployed in situations of international conflict with a mandate to m agreements and buffer zones. These operations have been referred to as the first generation of UN peacekeeping missions.2 The operations were based on the principle that the consent of the parties was required and they did not cons enforcement measures under chapter VII of the UN Charter. That meant the force was only allowed in self-defence.
This traditional concept of international peacekeeping has changed to a extent. Since the end of the cold war most of the conflicts the UN has to face are domestic rather than international. Increasingly, the UN has become engaged in more complex missions; providing civilian administrators and policemen, as well as soldiers, to oversee the implementation of peace plans negotiated by parties in con flict that have agreed to resolve their disputes at the ballot box. Examples of these operations, known as the 'second generation' of peacekeeping operations, were the missions in Cambodia (UNTAC), Namibia (UNTAG) and Mozambique (ONUMOZ).3 Common to all of these missions was the fact that they were still based on the consent of the parties.
Another development in the field of peacekeeping was the deployment of peacekeeping troops authorized to enforce actions taken pursuant to chapter VII of the UN Charter. The consent of the parties to the conflict is not needed for chapter VII operations. Examples include the missions UNPROFOR implemented in the former Yugoslavia and UNOSOM II in Somalia. In recent years the Security
Council has also granted particular states or groups of states, such as NATO or INTERFET, a mandate to undertake specific enforcement actions. In some cases these enforcement operations were supplemented by a UN peacekeeping presence, as with UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo, for example. A further new mechanism is represented by the United Nations governance in East Timor and Kosovo.4 On 10 June 1999, the Security Council established the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) by Resolution 1244 and on 25 October 1999 the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) by Resolution 1272. The UN was authorized to exercise all leg lative and executive powers over both territories including the administration o justice.5 The scope of the responsibilities and the range of the mandate in the cases were unprecedented in the history of UN peacekeeping operations. Missio of this type, which also acquire a broad legal dimension, have been called 'new trusteeships' or the fourth generation of peacekeeping.6
The following article describes the law and practice related to the adminis tration of East Timor, and discusses various problems flowing from it, such as the legal basis for the Security Council to set up such interim administrations.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND EAST TIMOR
East Timor's struggle for independence has been on the agenda of Nations for a long time.7 East Timor became a Portuguese colony in th tury while West Timor was under Dutch control at that time. West Tim part of Indonesia when the country gained independence in 1949. In 1 General Assembly decided that Timor and Dependencies were a non-se ing territory8 according to chapter IX of the UN Charter9 and to which t Assembly Resolution on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Cou Peoples10 applied. East Timor remained under Portuguese administratio After Portugal's withdrawal Indonesia occupied East Timor by military integrated it as its 27th province. The General Assembly passed several from 1975 to 1982, calling upon Indonesia to withdraw from the terr Security Council reacted in the same manner with Resolutions 384n a demanding that Indonesia withdraw its troops from East Timor, but demned the invasion as an act of aggression nor as a breach of article 2 UN Charter prohibiting the use of force. Although Indonesia did not further steps were taken by the Council.
Since the eighties, the United Nations tried to resolve the issue toge Indonesia and Portugal. In June 1998, Habibie, the new President of I proposed a special status for East Timor which, at that time, excluded pendence. The talks continued and finally a set of agreements w between Indonesia and Portugal on 5 May 1999,13 entrusting the Unite organize a 'popular consultation', giving the citizens of East Timor th UNTAET's mandate consists of the following elements:
• to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the East Timor,
• to establish an effective administration,
• to assist in the development of civil and social services,
• to ensure the co-ordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development,
• to support capacity-building for self government,
• to assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.21
UNTAET is headed by the Transitional Administrator, who is currently the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Sergio Vieira Del Mello, from Progress has been made by the establishment of a Legislation Committe autumn 2000 which includes representatives from the Cabinet, the Office of Principal Legal advisor, the Judicial Affairs Department, the Human Rights and the Gender Affairs Department of the National Planning Department. committee reviews draft regulation and advises the Cabinet on necessary ch
At the beginning of its work UNTAET failed to consult and involve the p of East Timor in the decision-making process although Security Resolution stressed '. . . the need for UNTAET to consult and cooperate closely with the Timorese people in order to carry out its mandate effectively with a view t development of local democratic institutions ...'. The growing criticism of the not to consult the East Timorese led UNTAET to set up the National Consu Council composed of a third of UN-representatives and two thirds East Timo
The Council provided the East Timorese with the possibility to express their o in the legislative process, although the Transitional Administrator could ign advice.27 The National Consultative Council was later replaced by the Natio Council which consists of 36 members coming from local parties and social grou
The Council can also initiate or modify regulations but the final decision is m the Transitional Administrator. Furthermore, a cabinet was established which a quasi-government and is led by the Transitional Administrator. A very imp task will be performed by the Constituent Assembly,29 which is the first demo cally elected body in the history of East Timor. Its primary task is to draft a tution for an independent and democratic East Timor. It can also consider regulations as may be referred by the National Administrator. The Constit Assembly will become the legislature in an independent East Timor.
The widespread violence which destroyed most private homes and go mental buildings, and the fact that most civil servants, being faithful to Indonesian government and fearing repression, left East Timor, led to the c of the entire administrative and judicial system.30 That made it necessary committed to the system by states responsible for their administration. How the actual governance was carried out by the state that granted the trusteeship acted on behalf of the United Nations. The idea of bringing back the various f of trusteeship has been raised in recent years in respect of failed states and determination disputes.37 But in fact, the United Nations never used the truste system again. The legal reason for not using it was that article 78 of the UN Char precludes the application of the trusteeship administration in the case of mem states. From a political point of view the application could be criticized as an ac neo-colonialism because it used to be common practice that the former colon powers administered the trust territory.
The first precedent for a non-trusteeship United Nations administration territory was the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA), w governed West New Guinea from 1962-1963.38 After a long dispute over the t tory, Indonesia and the Netherlands concluded a treaty transferring the adm tration to the UN in the form of UNTEA39 and the General Assembly t authorized the Secretary General to carry out the tasks entrusted to him in Agreement. According to the agreement UNTEA was empowered to legislate appoint government officials and to guarantee law and order in West New Gu Furthermore, UNTEA established a court system and regional councils. During operation which helped the transfer from Dutch to Indonesian rule, Dutch off were replaced by UN officials. UNTEA must be distinguished from the later e ences of the United Nations to administer a territory, such as UNTAET in the of East Timor. UNTEA was established as a response to the dispute between t Netherlands and Indonesia concerning the status of West New Guinea. The m purpose of the mission was the peaceful handing over from one country to ano and not to building a state machinery for an independent West New Guinea establishment of an administration was therefore a necessary side effect but not main objective of UNTEA.40
The very first occasion when the United Nations had been entrusted to take key aspects of the administration of a member state was the United Nat Transitional Authority (UNTAC) in Cambodia. If one compares the UN administration in East Timor and Kosovo with the old trusteeship system, it becomes apparent that both concepts serve similar purposes. According to article 76 of the UN Charter one of the main objectives of the trustee ship system was 'to promote ... The humanitarian catastrophe and not the infringement of the right of self determination in East Timor appears to be the decisive element in the Council's decision to determine the existence of a threat to peace. In Resolution 1272, accord ing to which UNTAET was established, the Security Council expressed its deep concern '... at reports indicating that systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian and human rights law have been committed . . The very same wording had been used in Resolution 1264 authorizing the deployment of INTERFET.
It was the third time in the history of the United Nations that the S Council characterized grave human rights abuses and humanitarian emerge an internal conflict as the sole reason to determine the existence of a threat t
In all other cases, the transnational consequences of the internal human violations, for example the flow of the Kurdish refugees towards the bord by the Iraqi repression, must be regarded as the decisive element why the Council considered these situations as threats to peace.48 Only the resolu passed in response to the conflicts in Rwanda and Somalia49 can be cited as examples where the Security Council viewed massive but purely internal rights violations, without transboundary effect, as a threat to the Nevertheless, one may conclude from recent practice that the Council is c more inclined to find that gross violations of human rights and humanitar gencies constitute threats to peace.
As the Security Council possesses very broad discretion to determine w stitutes a threat to international peace, the determination that the circums East Timor constituted a threat to peace must be considered as a proper ex its article 39 powers. Charter the Council's decisions must be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are among these purposes, there fore the Council always has to take them into account when acting under chapter VII. Since, as argued by some legal commentators,54 humanitarian law can be perceived as 'human rights in armed conflicts', the Council is also bound by rules of international humanitarian law.
(ii) Another limitation is imposed by legal norms which are considered to be jus cogens. Like the trusteeship system which was aimed at encouraging respect for h rights in the trust territory (see article 76(c) of the United Nations Charter), th administrators have to guarantee the human rights of the inhabitants of E Timor.59 This duty has been reaffirmed by the first UNTAET regulation, stated that 'everybody undertaking public duties or holding public office Timor shall recognize international human rights standards'.
It must be noted in the present context that all major human rights instrum allow derogation of certain rights in times of public emergency. However, s rights, including the right of life, the right to be free from torture or cruel, in or degrading treatment cannot be derogated from and therefore must be res at all times. The United Nations Administration of East Timor 259
The Duty to Respect International Humanitarian Law
The next issue to be addressed is whether international humanitarian law imposes any limitation on the UN administration in East Timor. International humanitarian law can be defined as 'those international rules, established by treaty or custom, which are specifically intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from inter national and non-international armed conflicts and which for humanitarian reasons, limit the right of the parties to a conflict to use methods and means of warfare of their choice or protect persons and property that are or may be affected by the conflict'.61
For a long time there has been a debate regarding the extent to which peace keeping forces are bound by international humanitarian law.62 According to the Secretary-General's Bulletin on Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law63 of 1999, not the whole set but the fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law are to be applied by the United Nations forces. As for the application of international humanitarian law it appears that with the latest arrival of UNTAET there was no armed conflict in East Timor, thus heralding an end to the ordinary application of the laws of war.
However, common article 2 to the Geneva Conventions does not limit its appli cation to an armed conflict -it extends to 'all cases of partial or total occupation . . . even if said occupation meets without armed resistance'. From a theoretical point of view one might therefore argue that there are analogies between traditional occupation and the UN administration in East Timor, as both exercise authority on a foreign territory and therefore, UNTAET should be subject at least to the prin example, the Australian Defence Force, which was the leading contingent of INTERFET and was deployed before the establishment of UNTAET, applied the law of military occupation only by way of guidelines. The legal application of the law of armed conflict was rejected on the following grounds. Firstly there was no armed conflict between INTERFET and Indonesia, secondly there was no armed conflict between UNTAET and the militia and thirdly no armed conflict between UNTAET and the people of East Timor.64
In respect to UNTAET international humanitarian law is also not applica from a legal point of view as UNTAET and the people of East Timor are no ligerent parties. Too many nations would also deny the application of intern humanitarian law de facto in times of peace as a matter of customary intern law on the ground of national sovereignty. Another fundamental difference under the law of belligerent occupation the authority of the occupying autho a de facto authority while UNTAET's authority is based on a chapter VII man therefore on a de jure authority. That means if peacekeepers on East Timo involved in situations which cannot be regarded as an armed conflict but m involve the use of force, they have to observe internationally recognized h rights standards and not international humanitarian law.
The Duty to Respect the Right of Self-Determination
Another limitation flows from the right of self-determination, which is one founding principles of the UN Charter and is well recognized as a legal right international law. Its precise scope and application was and is still under debat almost undisputed, that it does not entail the right of groups to secede from th to which they belong65 or the right of third parties to implement the principle.66 suffice to say in the present context that the principle of self-determination pos the right of a people to determine its own political status in a democratic way.67
In respect of UN administrations68 it means that the United Nations cannot im a particular form of government upon the population of a territory or a state by of invoking the enforcement provisions of the UN Charter against the will people concerned.69 In the present case, the United Nations has not violated the of self-determination of the East Timorese when it organized the referendu organizing the popular consultation it has left the decision to become independe to become an autonomous province to the people of East Timor. Furthermor subsequent establishment of UNTAET must be seen in the light of the atrocit human rights violations committed after the ballot as helping to end the confli providing peaceful living conditions by creating a functioning administration.
If we regard self-determination as the right of people to determine their political system freely without any kind of external domination in the po decision making process,70 one may argue that the way the East Timorese participate in the legislature, for example by leaving the Transitional Adminis a veto right in the legislative process, is an infringment of the East Timorese right to self-determination.
Time Limitation
Another important issue to be addressed is for how long can UNTAET und governmental functions over the people of East Timor?
The question 'How long can the Security Council uphold enforcement mea adopted under Chapter VII' is frequently asked. In particular, the issue has a concerning the durability of the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq. The answ always been the same: as long as a threat to peace and security exists, the Co can keep the enforcement measures in force. Neither in Kosovo nor in East did the United Nations want to install a permanent presence. Both administr are only interim as in the case of UNMIK or transitional as in the case of UN Like all peacekeeping missions their mandate is only limited for a period of t the United Nations wants to continue their mission on East Timor the mandate has to be prolonged.
The Duty to Prosecute Serious International Crimes
One may raise the question whether there is a duty upon the United Nations to prosecute persons who have been accused of crimes against humanity and other serious crimes71 committed in the aftermath of the referendum in East Timor.
Under international law a duty to extradite or prosecute exists, for example in respect of genocide and torture, based on the Genocide Convention of 1948 and the Torture Convention of 1984. Although the United Nations is not a party to the above mentioned conventions it is undisputed that the United Nations has legal personality,72 which implies that the United Nations can be bound mutatis mutandis by customary international law. In the present case the United Nations is also bound by the aut dedere aut judicare obligation laid down in the Genocide and Torture Conventions, as the conventions constitute customary international law and the United Nations takes over the functions of a state. However, the failure of Indonesia to deliver justice and the slow pace of the investigations by the Serious Crimes Unit has led to the call upon the international community to set up an international tribunal.84 The Security Council has already established two ad hoc tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR. As explained above such powers are granted to the Security Council by article 41 under chapter VII. In order to establish such an international tribunal for East Timor, the Security Council has to determine 'the existence of a threat to peace or breach of peace or an act of aggression'. However, it appears to be doubtful that under the present circum stances any of the required conditions is met. On the one hand, a threat to the peace occurred in East Timor two years ago, and this has been determined by the Security Council in several resolutions.85 Finally, the presence of INTERFET and UNTAET brought an end to the gross violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Therefore, the current situation cannot be regarded as a threat to peace anymore.
On the other hand, one may point out that even after two years the situation is still inherently unstable because of the continuing lack of accountability for these serious crimes, which breeds instability for East Timor and the region. Such a precarious situation might be regarded as a threat to peace.
Since UNTAET has already been granted full authority over the territory, including the administration of justice, the question is whether UNTAET could establish an international tribunal. This possibility must be rejected as UNTAET's mandate only extends to East Timor and not to Indonesia.
The Duty to Respect the Right to Good or Democratic Governanc
One of the issues at the heart of the current agenda of the United Nations i issue of global governance. The commitment to global governance has been example, reflected in the Agenda for Peace,86 in which the former Secret General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali, pointed out 'there i obvious connection between the democratic practices -such as the rule of la transparency in decision making and the achievement of true peace and secur any new and stable political order. These elements of good governance need promoted at all levels of international and national political communities. ' His successor, Secretary General Kofi Annan, has stated:
UN Programs now target virtually all the key elements of good governanc safeguarding the rule of law, verifying elections, training police, monitori human rights, fostering investments; and promoting accountable admin tration. Good governance is also a component of our work for peace. It ha a strong preventive aspect; it gives societies sound structures for econom and social development. In post conflict settings, good governance can p mote reconciliation and offer a path for consolidating peace.87
It is questionable whether there is an obligation under international law th
United Nations or states must practise good governance. The issue has increa been debated by legal scholars.88 Thomas M. Frank has argued for example there is an emerging right to democratic governance89 but he did not come other hand, customary international law has not yet developed to the point that there is a constant and uniform usage of states, which they consider as a legally binding minimum standard of good governance. In any case, the United Nations is well advised to take the concept of good governance as a moral imperative by developing structures of self-governance, organizing free and fair elections, taking into account the political aspirations of the people of East Timor and assisting them in the development of political institutions.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
For the very first time in United Nations history the organization atte and manage an entire state. The main achievement of UNTAET is th stable and secure environment for a nation which has not lived in pe
The Constituent Assembly was the first elected body in the history After independence the United Nations will not leave behind a comp administration91 but a structure which enables the East Timorese to state on their own. To the present day many problems are unresol mention the weak infrastructure, the problems of the educational sy mately 80,000 refugees remaining in camps and the above mentione the judicial system. Many mistakes made by UNTAET appear to because of a lack of experience and the chaotic situation UNTAET me
The East Timor Model could also be applied to other scenarios, for the request of governments and parties to a conflict. The take-over mental functions in toto by the United Nations could increase the c ing to an end certain conflicts by re-establishing a functioning state m on the rule of law. However, several lessons must be learnt from UN ence. The local population should be consulted from the beginning. T of the United Nations in building a transitional system, in particula justice system have to be increased.92 Less power should be vested in a transitional administrator and a more sophisticated system of chec must be installed. Whether such enterprises could be financed and w to a conflict would be willing to hand over the entire administration o state is another matter.93
